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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
OREGON SHORT LINE RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation, and UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMpANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs,

Case No.

vs.

8122

MURRAY CITY, a municipal corporation, and STATEWIDE PLUMBING
AND HEATING COMPANY, INC.,
a corporation,
Defendants.

BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff Railroad Companies filed herein a Statement of Points by way of cross appeal wherein it was urged
that the trial court erred in certain particulars. Those
Points will be urged and argued herein. However Plaintiffs
will be referred to herein as respondent and defendant Murray City as Appellant.
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The statement of facts as set forth in appellant's brief
is, with one or two minor exceptions, substantially correct,
as far as it goes, but there are numerous facts which are
very material and important in presenting the matter fully
to this court which appellant did not set forth. Respondent will add some of such facts here, as well as additional
facts in connection with points of argument.
Emphasis throughout is ours unless otherwise indicated.
On page 4 of its brief appellant states: "A power line
of Murray City runs down the east side of the tracks near
the east boundary line of the street and has been there since
1914-15." It is true there are some poles carrying a power
line on the east side of so-called 2nd West but they do not
run from 5300 to 6400 South. There was nowhere any testimony that the power lines ran such full distance, Mayor
Hansen merely testifying: "We have our power line on both
sides of the street" (R. 126). The map, Exhibit P-11, made
from actual survey and measurement of existing physical
features (R. 56), shows a Western Union pole line on the
east side running full distance about midway between the
track and east fence line. The only Murray pole or power
line on the east side extends a short distance north and south
from 61st South Street to serve the half-dozen homes in that
area. (See Exhibits D-10, P-11, P-37 and P-22 to P-26, inclusive.)
USE OF RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY
The fact is undisputed and indisputable that the railroad track was constructed during the summer of 1871 (R.
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34, 60) . The land was then all public domain, the first
patent in the area being dated July 10, 1872, covering property at the north end, and the next earliest being dated December 1, 1874 (R. 37-39). There has been no change in
the location of this railroad track since its original construction (R. 59). The property claimed by the railroad is now
fenced on both sides (R. 109-110) and has been fenced at
least since 1920 (Exhibits D-10, P-37) and has been returned to the state tax commission for tax assessment purposes
and taxes paid thereon to the state and Murray City at
least since 1917 (Exhibits P-7, 8 & 9; R. 47, 50).
In addition to building its track over the public domain,
the railroad company secured full warranty deeds of title
to the area claimed, except for a small strip in the north
end of Section 24. The latter area has been claimed by the
railroad, has been fenced and has been included in the tax
returns to the state tax commission and taxes paid on it
(Exhibits D-10, P-37, P-7, 8 & 9; R. 47, 50; see also County
Plat Ex. P-6; see also Trust Deeds and Mortgages in Exhibit D-32, Entries 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10).
USE OF AREA BY PUBLIC AS ROADWAY
There isn't a scintilla of evidence of any USE of any
of the area as a roadway or highway prior to the issuance of
patents from the United States Government, nor in fact
prior to 1899 or 1900. Mayor Hansen's earliest recollection
was about 1899, which would be when he was not over five
years old (R. 120, 121). The witness Wahlquist's recollection did not go prior to 1903 (R. 111, 118, 163). Both of
them said the roadway on the west side had been used as
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long as they could remember (R. 111). This use was by
pedestrians, horses and vehicular traffic, including carts,
wagons and automobiles (R. 102, 109). Wahlquist used
some roadway on the east side for two years while he was
going to school, 1903 to 1905, but could remember nothing
of it aside from those two years (R. 110-111). Mayor Hansen insisted the roadway on the east side was used longer
but was not definite as to the nature of such use after 61st
South was opened. 61st South was opened in 1905 (R. 106).
This supposed roadway on the east side was in front of the
school now located on 61st South Street and did not go all
the way to 6400 South. "There was a road, however, almost up to the Cahoon and Maxfield's used by the Pioneer
Nurseries" (R. 133). When asked as to who used it, the
Mayor answered, "The Nursery Company did and anyone
who come to purchase trees from the nursery" (R. 133).
The Nursery Company owned the property to the east of
the track and was the party who gave to Murray City the
deed to 61st South Street (Ex. D-33; R. 139).
There is no evidence as to when the school on 61st
South Street was first constructed. Respondent's counsel,
having no knowledge, refused to stipulate as to when the
school was constructed other than to stipulate that it was
constructed on the property deeded from James Randall
to named school trustees (R. 103). This deed was dated
April 7, 1875 (Ex. D-12), and Randall's patent December
1, 1874 (R. 38, 84). It was stipulated that a Mrs. McMillan
attended this school in 1881. Thus all that can be gained
from the evidence is that it was constructed sometime between April 7, 1875, the date of the deed and 1881.
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In the extreme upper left-hand corner of Exhibit P-20
is shown the school in front of which the roadway east of
the track was supposed to pass. This is the present school
but built on the same location as the old one. It was reconstructed in its present form in 1905 (R. 104). The first
construction of the old school was a long rectangular building with the main or only door opening on the south side
(R. 112, 113).
The only evidence of use of so-called 2nd West upon
which a definite conclusion could be reached or judgment
based shows a prescriptive use of an area starting 11 feet,
and more at various points, west of the center of the railroad track (see stipulation of counsel dated April 12, 1954;
see also Ex. P-11) and even this use as a roadway has not
extended to the west fence as claimed by Mayor Hansen because of the presence of the Murray City pole line (See Exs.
P-17, 18, and other pictures). This use has included not
only surface traveling and oil surfacing, but the construction of the power pole line and laying of culinary water pipes
under the ·surface of such roadway (R. 134-136).

STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH RESPONDENTS REQUEST REVERSAL
The court erred in finding that Murray City held
a fee title in trust for the public to the property described
in paragraph 17 of the findings of fact (R. 215), and in
failing to find that the railroad company held the fee title
to said property subject to such prescriptive rights as have
been acquired by the public therein.
1.
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(A) The court erred in finding, as set forth in Finding of Fact No. 9 (R. 210), that the public
used and acquired a right of way by use of said
property while the same was still public domain.
2. The court erred in concluding as it
graph 3 of its Conclusions of Law (R. 217),
City had the right to lay sewer mains under
described in paragraph 17 of the Findings of
authority or permission from the plaintiffs.

did in parathat Murray
the property
Fact without

3. The court erred in its Conclusions of Law, in paragraph 2 of its Decree (R. 222), in holding that plaintiffs
had no right to enjoin or restrain defendants from constructing sewer lines under said property without permission and in denying the injunction asked by plaintiffs.

RESTATEMENT OF POINTS SET FORTH AND
ARGUED BY APPELLANT
1. The court did not err in finding that the railroad
company had the fee simple title to property described in
paragraph 16 of the Findings of Fact.

(a) The rights of the public or of the railroad company secured by virtue of 43 U. S. C. A. 932,
depend upon acceptance by use prior to issuance
of patent.
(b) Railroads may acquire a right of way under the
act of Congress, 43 U.S. C. A. 932, and the taking of a strip of land and constructing its railroad thereon while still public domain was suf-
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ficient to effect such grant to the railroad
company.
(c) A public thoroughfare or highway under either
43 U. S. C. A. 932, or one acquired by prescription, is governed by actual use and reasonable
necessity of such use as actually made.
(d) There must be a highway shown to exist in the
first place before there can be any necessity of
argument re' abandonment of such highway.

ARGUMENT
In arguing the points involved on this appeal, respondent will first refer to the points set forth by appellant and
the argument of appellant with respect thereto.

SUBPARAGRAPHS
LANT'S POINT 1.

(a)

AND

(c)

OF APPEL-

Appellant's main point is that the court erred in not
finding that the full 4-rod width was a city street. Appellant would have to base such argument upon some appropriation and use sufficient to create such roadway of such
width while the property was still public domain. We will
combine for purpose of argument appellant's paragraphs
(a) and (c) because, if a right to a public way has been
acquired either under the federal act or by prescription, that
right must be shown by the actual use and will be limited
by the use, or the reasonable necessity of the use, which
created it.
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At the outset, we must express surprise, if not amazement, at the amount of conjecture and the number of ifs
and assumptions contained in appellant's brief. The argument starts with the assumption that "it seems fair" to
say plaintiffs intended to rely on deeds to show title. Why
then should plaintiffs go to the bother of securing an admission from defendants that the railroad was entirely constructed prior to the date of any patent and while the land
was still public domain (R. 34). Appellant on page 10 of
its brief refers to homestead laws providing for 5-year
occupancy and says if such was the basis of the patent to the
property in question, the street in question was occupied
(not used) by the patentees prior to the building of the
railroad. There is no evidence to which appellant can point
to answer that "if", and if such was the case, must it be
further assumed that such occupants used this so-called 2nd
West as a street, or should we assume that they used 59th
South or 64th South to come to State Street, the main state
and county highway.
Appellant says because the railroad offered no evidence
to show there was a street, the railroad must have been
constructed down a public highway. The mere statement
of such shows its absurdity. The railroad company proved
the construction of its railroad over public domain, plus the
securing of full warranty fee title deeds, which were secured
practically as soon as patent issued. It was appellants burden to show there was a street used before patent. The appellant admitted the railroad was constructed there in 1871
and there was no evidence of any USE of a road prior to
about 1900. On page 11, appellant says the trustees of the
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school "certainly believed" they were acquiring a tract of
land abutting on a highway. How do we know they so believed? They "must have believed" 61st South Street was
going to be opened because the front door to the school
faced the south (R. 112-113). On page 11 appellant states
"certainly Randall thought" there was a public road and
"Peter Hansen would likewise have to believe" there was
a county road there when he deeded to Myers, yet the evidence is conclusive as far as the Myers deed was concerned,
that there never was and never has been any sort of a
roadway south of 6400 South adjoining the property covered by the Myers deed (R. 113, 134, 162). On page 12 of
its brief appellant states that home owners "undoubtedly
believed" they were on a highway and "it would seem
reasonable" that if 2nd West existed only on the west side
there would have been trouble with the railroad company
before now.
IN SPITE OF ALL THESE ASSUMPTIONS AND
CONJECTURES THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER TO SUPPORT ANY OF THEM. Home owners now
have the only ingress and egress they have ever had, which
is that each one has a private crossing over the tracks to the
west side of the tracks (Ex. P-11). There was "trouble
with the railroad company" at least as far back as 1920
(R. 136) and it has been practically continuous, to Mayor
Hansen's own knowledge, for approximately twenty-five
years past.
If appellant wants to conjecture: It would "seem rea~
sonable" that if there were a county road in use, such road-
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way would have been mentioned in at least one of the deeds
by at least one of the five patentees when they gave their
deeds to the railroad company. If we must assume that both
the railroad and the roadway were established across property which was still public domain, couldn't we assume that
there would have been ample room for both without, as appellant now wishes, superimposing one on the other? If
we are to indulge further in conjecture, shouldn't we assume that Peter Hansen, the Mayor's ancestor and predecessor in interest, in giving trust deeds and mortgages as
he did in Entries 5, 6, 7, 8, and 10 of Exhibit D-32, would
have referred to a highway or roadway rather than outlining specifically the railroad right of way, as he did, extending 33 feet on either side of the center of the track? These
mortgages in which he so outlined the railroad right of way,
without any reference to a roadway are dated respectively
1876, 1878, 1880, 1884, and 1885. Surely, Peter Hansen
with his Scandinavian astuteness would no more want to
mortgage a county road extending across his property than
he would a right of way which he considered the railroad
had acquired across his property.
If we want to further indulge in assumptions, we could
assume that the deeds upon which appellant seems to place
so much reliance showing courses running to a "county
road" are merely an indication that the people in the area
intended to open up a county road in some manner and expected it to extend south of 6400 South as referred to in
the Myers deeds, as well as north.
There is no escape from the admitted fact that the railroad was actually constructed in 1871. The only logical
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conclusion, therefore, is that the people in the area as it
grew began to travel along the railroad track, as was done
in many instances in the early west, and if we want to indulge in assumption, the most logical assumption would
be that this travel along the track was not objected to by
the railroad company and was not of great extent, at least
until after the smelters were located in the area and the use
of the so-called 2nd West Street no doubt received its
greatest impetous with its use by the ore wagons which
came west along 64th South Street and then north along
the west side of the track to the smelters (R. 137-138).
That is when 2nd West Street really began to be traveled
as a roadway and that was sometime around approximately
1900, or later. Even then it must not have been used to
any great extent until after the extension of Murray City
limits to include the whole area, because there appears' to
have been a very definite change even in the official maps
of Murray City from the time that Murray was first incorporated, about 1903, as shown by Exhibit D-30, to a
time when the Murray City limits were extended in 1905,
as shown in Exhibit D-29.

EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT
In spite of the foregoing, we most respectfully urge
that neither this court nor the trial court can base its
decisions upon ifs, assumptions, conjectures, "must have
beens", or "certainly believes." We must therefore see
what the EVIDENCE was upon which the trial court based,
or should have based, its findings and decision.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
Appellant states at page 9 of its brief: "It is the position of the City that the 4-rod street was being used by
the public prior to the construction of the railroad and that
the public right to the highway was acquired pursuant to
Section 932." There is no EVIDENCE whatsoever of any
use of any roadway prior to construction of the railroad or
prior to issuance of patents. Liberty School was located in
the 6100 South area to the east of the tracks sometime after
patent. It was stipulated that a Mrs. McMillan went to
that Liberty School in 1881, but the stipulation did not extend so far as to say what, if any, roadway she used to get
to the school (R. 103), nor that she even lived in the Second
West area; she may have lived somewhere east of the
school.
With respect to use of any area on the west side of the
tracks, there is nothing · but conjecture to show any use
prior to approximately 1899 (R. 120), which was the point
of earliest recollection as far as Mayor Hansen was concerned, and with respect to his recollection one of the earliest
things that he could specifically remember was when an
engine turned over at the smelters, which were constructed
around 1903 (R. 122).
Apparently the same rules apply with respect to
acquisition of a highway under 43 U.S. C. A. 932, as where
one is acquired by prescription. Therefore, in discussing
this matter further, we will state that we will apply the
same law to our argument on this point as we will later
apply to plaintiff's contention that Murray City holds only
a prescriptive right along the west side of the track (respondent's points 1 and 1 (A)).
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It will be interesting to refer to the two cases from this
court cited by the appellant which have involved 43 U. S. C.
A. 932. In Lindsay Land & Livestock Co. v. Churnos, 75
Utah 384, 285 P. 646, the land in question did not pass from
the United States to private owners by patent until sometime after 1894. The evidence was "substantially uncontradicted" and showed that land over which the roadway
was located was "unenclosed and uninhabited mountain
lands suitable only for grazing purposes." The area had
been "extensively used for summer grazing for many years
by owners of sheep who trailed them over the route in question * * *." "In 1876 a sawmill was constructed in
Davenport Canyon and the road in question was first definitely located and commenced to be used." "In about the
year 1885" a mining camp was established in the locality
and the road used for it.
"During all of the time from 1876 until shortly before
the commencement of this action the road was used by
numerous owners of sheep * * * trailing their herds
to and from the summer range and * * * moving their
camps and supplies to their herds." "The use of the road for
this purpose was general and extensive." There "must have
been a hundred herds." One witness "had 'seen as high as
seven herds a day' going over the road." There was no
assumption, conjecture, or "ifs" in connection with this.
This witness had seen the road actually thus used. One
witness for the plaintiff testified that herds of sheep while
trailing through occupied a space of 200 yards on each side
of the road (a wagon roadway was admitted by both parties). Others said 100 feet or more, and the trial court held
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the road to be 100 feet in width. "There was evidence that
more than this width had actually been used," although the
court inferred that had only sawmills or mining been involved the result might have been different.
This court referred to cases holding that even where
there is no formal acceptance of such a grant (under the
federal act) , acceptance is shown by evidence of "continued
use of the road by the public for such length of time and
under such circumstances as to clearly indicate an intention
on the part of the public to accept the grant." This court
further referred to early statutes providing that "roads
laid out and recorded as highways and * * * used
* * * for five years, are highways." And where not
laid out by public authority, become highways where "continually and uninterruptedly used as a public thoroughfare
for a period of ten years." This court concluded that the
evidence showed that the road had been used by the· public
"from 1876 to 1894," which was prior to patent and while
still public domain, and that this was "a time in excess of
that required by the territorial statutes in force for creating a public highway by use."
We accept that case as good law, but there is absolutely
no parallel between it and the case at bar and no evidence
here whatsoever of public use of any roadway along socalled 2nd West while the land was public domain, nor at
any time prior to approximately 1900.
Counsel for appellant places some reliance upon the
case of Jeremy v. Bertagnole, 101 Utah 1, 116 P. 2d 420,
in his attempt to show the "reasonable necessity" that gov-
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erns the width of a road acquired by such use. In the Bertagnole case one witness, a William Archibald, testified to his
personal knowledge, from his own observation, that the
roadway in question was used "as early as 1869."
"In addition to the evidence adduced as to the
existence of a roadway in 1869, some thirteen witnesses testified to the use of the road for vehicular
and other traffic between 1877 and 1900 and an
equal number as to its use since the latter date. Under the laws of 1880 and 1886, quoted supra, there
is unquestionably abundant evidence to support the
trial court's finding or conclusion that the roadway
was dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public as a public highway."
The laws of 1880 and 1886 referred to were the same
as involved in and were set out in a quote from the Lindsay
Livestock case, supra, with respect to roads used for five
years after being laid out and recorded by the county recorder and roads otherwise deemed abandoned to the public
by uninterrupted use for a period of ten years. In the
Bertagnole case this court said:

"* * * While it is true, as contended by appellant, that where dedication is established by user,
the use to whick the way has been put measures the
extent of the right to use, this limitation goes to the
kind of use. The particular use having been established, such width should be decreed by the court as
will make such use convenient and safe. A bridle
path abandoned to the public may not be expanded,
by court decree, into a boulevard. On the other hand,
the implied dedication of a roadway to automobile
traffic is the dedication of a roadway of sufficient
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width for safe and convenient use thereof by such
traffic.
"Twenty-eight witnesses were called by defendants, who testified to the nature of the road and the
use thereof which they had observed, as well as the
use which they had themselves made of the road.
With respect to the use thereof for herding sheep
and cattle, William Archibald testified that he observed sheep and cattle using it in the early seventies.
He worked out poll tax on the road forty years ago.
Use of the road by sheep made work on the road
necessary.
"Testimony of other witnesses was to the effect
that at various times they drove sheep and cattle
along the trail. Such testimony covers a period from
the 1870's to the time of trial. * * * From the
evidence adduced the inference is clearly a reasonable one that the road was used for the driving of
cattle and sheep for a number of years in excess of
that required, whenever it was necessary or convenient for the members of the public who were engaged in raising or herding stock to so use it."
In the case at bar not only is there an absolute lack
of evidence with respect to use or showing of any necessity
for use of the 4-rod width, but the only actual use shown
that is of sufficiently definite a nature to enable a court to
base any conclusions thereon is the use of that portion west
of the tracks since 1900 and as the same has since been oilsurfaced by Murray City (See Exs. P-11 and 16 to 26, inclusive) . Such use as shown is sufficient to prove a prescriptive right along the west side, but nothing more.
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PRESCRIPTIVE USE
What is the extent of this prescriptive right? On page
17 of its brief appellant seems to assume that because the
Peter Hansen deed to Carl F. Myer referred to a 4-rod street
that that would be a reasonable street. Would appellant
insist that by virtue of that deed to Myer, and nothing else,
the railroad company could be compelled to open a 4-rod
street over and along its tracks extending along the property included in the Myer deed south of 64th South? On
page 17 counsel states, referring to the entire area involved :
"There is no evidence that there was ever a 4rod street on either the east or west side of the railroad tracks."
With such statement we wholeheartedly agree. But
counsel goes on to state:
"But there is now, and has for many years been,
a 4-rod street with the railroad tracks running down
the center of it."
Does the fact that counsel calls this a street make it
one, or would the fact that counsef for respondent would
say that that was a 4-rod railroad right of way preclude
the appellant? The evidence conclusively shows that there
is not now and never has been a 4-rod street with railroad
tracks running down the center of it. There is not even a
4-rod area enclosed between the right-of-way fences as they
exist north of the dividing line between Sections 13 and 24.
The only thing which shows a 4-rod street or a 4-rod right
of way north of Section 24 is the fee title deeds to the railroad company. Even the fences as they are now in place,
particularly along the west side as they extend north from
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the north line of Section 24, do not follow along the claimec
right-of-way line nor within the 4-rod area claimed by th~
railroad company (see Ex. P-11). South of the dividing lin~
between Section 13 and Section 24 the fences have in th1
past and do now approximately encompass a 4-rod width.
Counsel refers to the power lines. Does the existence
of a power line give a right of surface travel or, indeed
show any prior surface travel? Counsel again conjecturef
by saying: "It seems reasonable to say that a 4-rod stree1
would be a reasonable width," for public use. And at thE
top of page 18 counsel goes on with further "ifs" and "as.
sumptions." We must again state that before any width car
be assumed there must be shown a use and the nature of thE
use to show what width would be reasonable. The best evi·
dence of what would be reasonable for the use actually madE
is to look at what has actually existed for the last fifty year~
and what was at first covered with an oil mat, and later wiU
a hard-surfaced oil, as now used by Murray City (R. 126),
The use of one side of the track, with no use being made
or having been possible of the area where the track is laid:
would not under any law that counsel has cited, nor in om
opinion that he could find, be sufficient to give a right tc
use the other side of the track or to compel the moving oj
the railroad tracks because Murray City now thought it wa~
necessary to widen the strip west of the tracks. If morE
property is necessary, Murray City will have to resort tc
proper statutory eminent domain.
In addition to lack of use being shown, it affirmative!~
appears that portions of the area east of the track could no1
have been used. There are swamp areas which had to be
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filled on the west side but which still exist on the east side
(R. 132-133; Exhibit P-19), including some areas wet
enough to produce cattails (R. 131-132; Exhibit P-22).
EFFECT OF RECITALS IN ANCIENT DEEDS
Appellant put in evidence, over the objection of plaintiffs, by the testimony of the abstracter Alton Lund, certain recitals in early deeds from Peter Hansen and James
Randall, patentees, to certain parties named in such deeds.
There was likewise introduced in evidence, over plaintiffs'
objection, Exhibit D-12 upon which Murray City engineer
platted the descriptions of such deeds from Hansen and
Randall. Ordinarily, ancient deeds or recitals therein are
inadmissible in evidence and are considered purely as hearsay except between the parties thereto. There is, however,
some exception under which recitals in ancient deeds are
admissible in evidence-"When accompanied by possession
under the deed or other corroborating circumstances."
(See Am. Jur., Vol. 20, Sec. 941, p. 794.)
The rule under which such recitals are admitted in evidence constitutes an exception to the hearsay rule and the
cases which have been decided upon the subject are practically unanimous in holding that such recitals will be admitted, not to prove the existence of a certain fact not otherwise shown, NOR the possession or occupancy of certain
property NOR the location of a certain roadway, river or
creek, BUT if the existence of such roadway, waterway or
other point in issue at the time involved is first proved, or
if actual and long-continued possession of the property involved is shown, then recitals in such ancient documents will
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be admissible to help define the limits or otherwise bolster
the proof of location of such roadway, creek, or boundary
line. It was for this reason that respondent's counsel objected to evidence of recitals in these deeds on the grounds,
not only that they were hearsay and incompetent, but that
no proper foundation had been laid to make them admissible
(R. 77-81, 99-100).
In the annotation following the case of Gabarino v. N oce
(Cal.), 183 P. 532, in 6 A. L. R. 1437, reference is made to
the admissible types of recitals in ancient deeds, and included are the following:
"Recitals" as to "source of title." These recitals relating to the person or persons from whom the title claimed
by parties in the action was derived are admissible "but
only in connection with other proof of a long continued and
undisputed possession in accordance with the right or title
claimed."
"Recitals as to extent of title," "where the EXTENT of
the property conveyed, or the location of boundary lines"
with respect to property so conveyed, are in dispute
"ancient deeds are properly admitted in evidence to prove
these matters." But conveyance of the property must be
first shown, and such ancient deeds are not admitted to
prove the conveyance or title itself, except as they may be
necessary as a part of the chain of title concerned in the
lawsuit.
"The cases are in accord in holding that recitals
in ancient deeds are evidence of facts recited therein
as against strangers to the title when accompanied
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by possession under the deed or other corroborating
circumstances."
Wigmore, in his work on Evidence, Third Edition, Vol.
V, Sec. 1573, page 430, in discussing the question of such
recitals, refers to the early United States case of Carver v.
Jackson, 4 Peter 1, 83, 7 L. Ed. 761. In that case an attempt was made to prove a lease. In a marriage settlement
contract, which was designated as a deed of release, certain
property had been set apart to third parties, and in this
marriage settlement contract there were certain recitals
concerning the lease, and the question was whether the recitals were sufficient and competent evidence of the proof
of the lease. The United States Supreme Court held that the
recital was not per se evidence of the lease, "but if the existence and loss of the lease be established by other evidence,
then the recital is admissible as secondary proof in the absence of more perfect evidence, to establish the contents of
the lease."
Thus, the existence of such lease must be first established, or the fact of conveyance of certain property, title
to which is claimed, must be first established and then recitals may assist in showing the limits or extent of the property conveyed. With respect to the situation on 2nd West
in Murray there must first be proof of the establishment
and existence of a roadway at the time of the deed. Then if
the existence and use of the roadway is otherwise proved,
ancient deeds may be admissible as some evidence tending
to show its boundary or location at that time.
The usual case where such deeds are admissible involves deeds showing boundary lines between present oc-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
cupants of property where there is a dispute between them,
and one party will be held to be bound by recitals made in
deeds by his predecessor in title. And even then, recitals
showing such boundary are not admissible unless it is
shown that the original deed by which the property in question was conveyed, in which the boundary was set forth,
is lost. As stated by Wigmore, Third Ed., Vol. V, p. 431:
"That such a recital is not admissible where the original
deed recited is not accounted for as lost or the like seems
unquestioned." Therefore, in the case at bar there would
have to be proof of a deed or other conveyance granting the
4-rod strip to the county as a county road or some other
formal action showing the actual esta)>lishment of such 4rod strip as a county road, plus a showing that the original
deed or dedication is lost ;-but there must be no question
but that there was an actual conveyance or establishment
of such county road, and then perhaps such deeds would be
admissible to help define the boundaries of the road.
Another case referred to by Wigmore is Drury v.
Afidland R. Co., 127 Mass. 571. The question in that case
concerned the location of the channel of a creek. There was
no question about the fact that the creek had actually existed
and had been filled in. The only question was as to its exact
location. Plans in ancient documents were held admissible
tc show the former or original location of the creek. (See
Section 1575, Wigmore, cited supra.)
The usual case supporting the text statements above
referred to is like that of Village of Oxford v. Willoughby,
(N. Y.), 73 N. E. 677. The city sued to enjoin the defendants from encroaching upon a public street by the construe-
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tion of a building. An ancient deed from one Stevens conveying Property to a turnpike company was introduced in
evidence to show the boundary line of the defendants' property and the street line, the extent of defendants' property
which they still held possession of being the question in
issue. In order to prove their title the defendants had to
rely on some other deeds from the same Stevens, who was
a predecessor in interest. There was offered in evidence
the turnpike deed from Stevens and also a city map which
had been prepared by Stevens in dedicating some of the
streets. The court held that the Stevens turnpike deed and
the map were properly admitted.
It will be noted here that the question was as to the
boundary of the street and the boundary of the defendants'
property, possession of which they held. The present
possession of defendants' property under deeds from predecessors was admitted, and the prior existence of the street
was proved without question. THE ACTUAL DEED CONVEYING THE TURNPIKE WAS PUT IN EVIDENCE.
The deeds were admitted merely to locate the boundary
line, and the deeds under which the defendants themselves
claimed referred to the Stevens map, which showed the
boundary line.

See Twinning v. Goodwin (Conn.), 77 A. 953, where
the court held that what was generally "understood" and
"talked about" as to location or existence of a right of way
was inadmissible.
See also :
New York, N.H. & H. R. Co. v. Sella, (Conn.)
91 A. 972;
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Horgan v. Town Council of Jamestown, (R. 1.)
80 A. 271;
Ray v. Farrow, (Ala.), 100 S. 868.
See also Wilson v. Snow, 228 U. S. 217, 57 L. Ed. 807,
33 S. Ct. 487, wherein the United States Supreme Court
referred to the fact that "the deed was more than thirty
years old. The possession of the land had for forty years
been consistent with its terms and it was therefore admissible as an ancient deed * * * "
OLD DEEDS DO NOT PROVE LOCATION OF ROADWAY AS CONTENDED BY APPELLANT.
There is one other thing to which we must call the
court's attention in connection with the ancient deeds and
recitals therefrom as introduced by appellant over plaintiff's objection. The witness Wood, as engineer of Murray
City, made an actual survey of the area (R. 66) and prepared Exhibit D-12 from such actual survey. After making
the actual survey, he took the deeds according to the descriptions as furnished by Abstracter Lund and platted them on
the map as produced from his actual survey (R. 68). With
respect to the Exhibit D-12, the line of the railroad itself,
2nd West, and the entire area involved were put on the map
from actual field survey (R. 71-72). Then the descriptions
in the deeds produced by Lund were platted on the map,"if you measured in the field you would get the same thing
you would get on the map" (R. 71). From those descriptions
as given, it will be seen on Exhibit D-12 that the 4-rod street
as so referred to in the deeds lies entirely to the west of the
railroad track. Therefore, even if the descriptions in the
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deeds were taken at face value, they would not prove what
appellant and its counsel seem to contend but could not
help but indicate that such 4-rod street as referred to in
the deeds lay entirely to the west of the railroad tracks
as constructed. We merely refer to this aside from any
question of admissibility of such deeds or of any proof of
actual possession of or existence or use of any such roadway
prior to 1900.
OFFICIAL HIGHWAY MAP AND OFFICIAL MURRAY
CITY PLAT DISPROVE EXISTENCE AND USE OF
2ND WEST AS A PUBLIC ROADWAY OR STREET
PRIOR TO 1900.
When Utah was admitted to the Union as a state one
of the first acts of the State Legislature was to authorize
the compilation and issuance of revised statutes. As a result of this legislative action, the Revised Statutes of Utah
of 1898 were put into force and became effective as of
January 1, 1898. Section 1122 of those Revised Statutes
provided:
"It shall be the duty of the Board of County
Commissioners in each county immediately to determine all public highways existing in its county,
and to prepare in duplicate, plats and specific descriptions of the same and of such other highways as
such Board may from time to time locate upon public lands, one copy of which shall be kept on file in
the office of the County Clerk, and the other, said
Board shall cause to be filed in the office of the
State Board of Land Commissioners."
As a result of and pursuant to this statutory mandate
the county surveyor of Salt Lake County did prepare a map
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of all of the public highways in Salt Lake County and under
date of March 7, 1898 this official map was presented to
and approved by the County Commissioners (R. 148).
Minutes from the County Commissioners' records as of that
date show: "Map of Salt Lake County showing particularly
the highways was presented to the board by County Surveyor
Wilcox. On motion said map is hereby accepted as the official map of the State of Utah highways and the county
surveyor is directed to file one with the county clerk and
one with the State Board of Land Commissioners in accordance with the statute of 1898." The map as introduced
(Ex. P-34), was one of three maps together designated as
"G-16 A, B, C." The three maps were three sections making
a complete county map and together constitute the same as
one map covering the whole of Salt Lake county (R. 150).
The maps are dated, drawn to a scale which is indicated on
each map, and certified to as the official maps presented
to and accepted by the County Commission pursuant to the
statute above quoted. The certification as so contained on
such maps is shown by Exhibit P-35. These maps were and
are a part of the official records of the Salt Lake County
Surveyor's office (R. 154).
On Exhibit P-34 there is shown a "highway" designated
as "highway No. 10." It is shown as being a direct continuation of 2nd West Street in Salt Lake City, Utah, and extends directly south from 2nd West Street in Salt Lake City
in approximately a direct southerly line until after it crosses
Little Cottonwood Creek in the NE 1,4 of Section 12, T. 2 S.,
Range 1 West. From that point the highway bears slightly
to the east and near the southern line of Section 12 crosses
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both the Rio Grande and Oregon Short Line railroad tracks
and continues to extend in a southeasterly direction through
the NE 14 of Section 13, and also in a southeast direction
through the N ¥2 of the SE 14 of Section 13, until it meets
and crosses what is designated as highway No. 76 coming
west from State Street. Said street designated as highway
No. 10 continues on thence southerly through the E 112 of
Section 24, and into the NE 14 of Section 25, crossing
a highway designated as highway No. 79 in the Northeast
quarter of Section 24. The map shows that said highway
No. 10, after crossing the Rio Grande and Oregon Short
Line tracks near the south line of Section 12 continues to
bear to the east and, rather than following the Oregon Short
Line railroad tracks, extends and goes on southeasterly and
then south some distance to the east of the Oregon Short
Line tracks. The map being drawn on a scale of 2000 feet
to the inch shows that this highway No. 10 is Ij8 th of an
inch, or 250 feet, east of the Oregon Short Line tracks at
the center line of Section 13; is 3/16th of an inch, or 375
feet, east of the Oregon Short Line tracks where it crosses
highway No. 76 in the North half of the Southeast quarter
of Section 13; and then it continues at approximately the
same distance (which would be approximately 375 feet)
east of the Oregon Short Line railroad tracks as it crosses
the dividing line between Sections 13 and 24 and as it
continues on southerly beyond highway No. 79 and on into
Section 25.
It is inconceivable that if there had been a traveled

area on either side of the Oregon Short Line tracks which
had been used and traveled sufficiently in any respect to
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be considered as a public highway it would not have been
shown on this official map in some way or another. This
map was made pursuant to statutory mandate directing
that the county make and file a map showing all public
highways and was submitted by the county surveyor as
such, accepted by the county commissioners as such OFFICIAL MAP, and one copy was filed with the county clerk
and one with the State Board of Land Commissioners pursuant to the statutory mandate.
When Murray was first incorporated as a city, official
maps and plats were filed by and on behalf of Murray City
(R. 81-83) showing the line of the city limits and showing,
or purporting to show, at least some of the roads and highways within the limits of Murray City. Exhibit D-30 is a
photostat of such official map or "official plat" as filed by
Murray City with the county recorder at the time Murray
was incorporated (R. 90). This Murray "official plat" was
filed and recorded in the office of the county recorder under
date of December 1, 1902 (R. 90). An examination of such
exhibit shows a highway, designated thereon as highway
No. 10, as coming in approximately a southerly direction
into the Northeast quarter of Section 12, Township 2 South,
Range 1 West. At approximately what would be the eastwest center line, if the Northeast quarter of Section 12 were
so divided (which would be approximately the point where
such roadway would cross Little Cottonwood Creek), said
highway No. 10 turns and bears to the southeast in exactly
the same manner and follows the same line of direction as
such highway No. 10 is shown to follow on Exhibit P-34.
Although the Oregon Short Line railroad track is not shown
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with reference to this highway, it will be noted that as
said highway No. 10 crosses the south line of Section 12
and into what would be the Northeast quarter of Section
13 it is still extending in the same southeast direction, and
instead of going on approximately a north-south line, as
the railroad track does, it continues to diverge to the east,
farther and farther away from what would be the center
line of both Sections 12 and 13.
In about 1905, Murray City extended- its city limits
and a further "official plat Murray" was filed and recorded
in the office of the county recorder under date of June 26,
1905,-Exhibit D-29 (R. 90). On this plat for the first time
there is shown extending through the S 1/2 of the NE 1;4 of
Section 13, and through the SE 1;4 of Section 13, and into
the NE 1;4 of Section 24, a segment of "highway No. 10,"
which coincides with and is superimposed upon the Oregon
Short Line railroad, and as will be readily seen by ordinary
observation and more clearly by placing a ruler on such
map, said "highway No. 10" rather than extending in a
southeasterly direction as it extends southerly, bears slightly to the west of south, being some distance closer to the
north-south center line of Section 24 than to the north-south
center line of Sections 12 and 13 where those two sections
meet.
The official plat Exhibit D-30 was filed as an official
act by Murray City on incorporation and would constitute
an admission by Murray City as of that time that highway
No. 10, whether it be in actual existence or only in contemplation, extended in a southeasterly direction through
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the area involved. It would be an admission on the part of
Murray City and an acknowledgment by Murray City that
such highway No. 10 as shown on Exhibit P-34 was correct,
and a further acknowledgment that as of that time there
was no official roadway or highway extending north and
south along the Oregon Short Line railroad tracks, and
the only time and the first time that such highway No. 10
is shown or claimed to coincide with the Oregon Short Line
railroad tracks is by the Exhibit D-29 as filed and recorded
on June 26, 1905 (R. 90).
These official maps should be conClusive evidence, Exhibit P-34 having been made and filed pursuant to statutory
mandate, to effectively conclude the matter here and furnish
sufficient basis upon which the trial court, as the trier of
fact, should have concluded as he did, that there was no
roadway established immediately adjacent to and within
the 2-rod area east of the railroad tracks, but which, together with entire lack of evidence of use of any roadway
while the property was still public domain, likewise should
have been sufficient to compel a conclusion on the part of
the court that there was no public roadway or highway of
any kind immediately adjacent to or following closely either
side of the railroad track at any time prior to the period
between 1900 and 1905, and that therefore the only right
that is shown or could be shown by the evidence to any roadway along such track is a prescriptive right acquired along
the west side of the track by use since such use was started
sometime between 1900 and 1905, and very apparently
started with the construction and placing in operation of the
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American Smelting & Refining Company's plant in about
1903.
That there has been some change in this so-called highway No. 10 is very apparent from the photostats of the socalled "Bible" introduced in evidence by defendant (R.
167-170), but which photostats were supplied after conclusion of the trial and therefore appear as unnumbered exhibits. Pages 94 and 95 of such photostats, being designated
"Field notes of the survey of Highway No. 10 (Second W.
St.)," show such 2nd West Street or "highway No. 10"
starting from 13th South as it was then designated, or what
is as we know it today-2700 South, as shown by the pencil
notations (R. 170-171), and shows a continuation of this
2nd West Street in an almost direct southerly course, bearing in one column a direction of "S. 0°1' W.," and in a
second column "S. 0°9' W.," and in a third column "S. 0°10'
E." The pencil notations show that this street at such time
extended thus from 2700 South to a point after it crossed
4500 South as we know such streets today. However, the
witness Wahlquist testified (R. 113), that the north end
of this 2nd West Street today is at about 43rd South and
it is not straight from there on south. The roadway comes
straight from 4300 South to 4800 South, then jogs to the
east, then goes south almost to 5300 South, and turns off
a little bit to the west as it comes into 5300 South, then in
order to go on south on 2nd West you have to come a ways
east on 5300 South and turn down between the Oregon Short
Line and Denver & Rio Grande tracks (R. 114). There have
undoubtedly been a number of changes throughout the
whole area and if we want to conjecture or assume, as ap-
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pellant has done in so many instances, we should perhaps
assume some change in the roadway near the south line of
Section 12 at the time the American Smelting & Refining
plant was built. But whether we conjecture or not, the
evidence by these field notes of actual survey of Highway
No. 10 shows that such highway No. 10 is not the same
today north of 4500 South as it was when this actual survey was made, and whether such highway No. 10 was in
actual existence or only contemplated as it extended farther
south through Sections 12, 13 and 24, it is apparent that
there have been some changes made. However, one IF that
I think we are justified in urging here, is that if there had
been any public roadway or highway adjacent to and paralleling the Oregon Short Line railroad tracks through this
area in 1898 when Exhibit P-34 was made, or in 1902 when
Exhibit D-30 was officially filed, such roadway would have
been shown at least on the official mandated map, Exhibit
P-34, if not also on Exhibit D-30, and particularly would
any public roadway along the tracks have been shown if
such highway No. 10 as it so extended into the area was not
actually in existence as claimed by defendant, and if the
roadway along the tracks was in existence as claimed by
defendants.
Again we state, these official maps and official plats
are conclusive to show that there was no public road or
highway adjacent to or paralleling the railroad tracks in
question prior to sometime between 1898 and 1905. Therefore, all that the defendants can claim under the evidence
in this case is a prescriptive right acquired by actual use and
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travel over the roadway to the west of the track during the
past approximately 50 years.
(b) SECTION 43 U. S. C. A. 932, GRANTING
RIGHTS OF WAY "FOR THE CONSTRUCTION
OF HIGHWAYS OVER PUBLIC LANDS" DOES
APPLY TO RAILROADS, AND THE PREDECESSORS IN INTEREST OF THE PLAINTIFFS HEREIN ACQUIRED A VALID RIGHT
OF WAY THEREUNDER.
Counsel for appellant admits that "this section has
been construed in a number of cases" and admits that with
respect to the position he takes there is some conflict of
authority, but counsel urges in his brief that "in spite of
the conflict of authority" the case of Burlington, K. & S.
W. R. Co. v. Johnson (Kan., 1887), 16 P. 125, is "the best
reasoned one" of such cases. It is true that in said case the
Kansas Supreme Cou:rt held that the term ~'highways" did
not include railroads. A study of that case, however, will
convince anyone that such a decision was not necessary to
the determination of that case, a number Qf other valid and
much more compelling reasons being set forth in the opinion
to support the judgment in the case, which involved as "the
principal point in controversy'' the measure of damages to
which J obnson was entitled. Reference was made in the
opinion to the fact that rulings of the federal land department prior to the date of that case held that "a valid home. .
stead entry operates as an appropriation and reservation
of the land embraced in the same * * * " and "* * *
segregates the tract from the mass of the public domain."
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Therefore, whether the statutory use of the word "highways" referred to railroads or not, the particular land had
by the homestead entry been segregated from the public
domain so that no sort of a highway could have been
acquired over it. Under early law it was held that lands
subject to homestead entry were still property of the United
States as Public Domain and the government held full title
to the same until patent was issued. That theory, however,
was changed, first, by the land department's rulings, and
later by the courts themselves, the Supreme Court case of
Hastings & Dakota R. Co. v. Whitney, 132 U. S. 357, 10 S.
Ct. 112, 33 L. Ed. 363, which was decided shortly after the
Johnson case, holding that a valid homestead entry is a
sufficient appropriation of land to segregate the homestead
tract from the public domain and that such homestead entry
precluded the possibility of any subsequent grant of such
tract by Congress in any manner.
The real basis and purport of the decision in the Johnson case was that "the land when homesteaded ceased to
be a part of the public domain," that "the homestead entry
gives the homesteader the exclusive right of possession, not
only against individuals, but against the government." See
United States v. Turner, 54 Fed. 228 (1892), which cited
and followed the Johnson case and referred to it as holding
that "the homestead entry operated as an appropriation
and reservation of the lands embraced in the same, and seg~
regated the tract from the public domain." This view of
the Johnson case has been confirmed by the Supreme Court
of Kansas itself. See Union Pacific R. Co. v. Harris, (Kansas), 91 P. 68.
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Appellant's counsel, although admitting some conflict
in the authority, refers to the Johnson case as "the best
reasoned one." We firmly disagree and insist that the best
reasoned case is the case of Flint & P. M. Ry. Co. v. Gordon,
(Mich. 1879), 2 N. W. 648. The writer of the opinion in
the Michigan case was Judge Cooley, who was early recognized as an authority and has long been recognized as ali
eminent authority on constitutional and statutory subjects.
In a rather exhaustive opinion Judge Cooley held that railways, though not strictly highways like plank and macadamized roads, were "highways" within the section of the
federal act referred to and were entitled to the benefit of
the provisions of that act. Judge Cooley referred to the fact
that an earlier act of Congress, passed in 1852, had been
allowed to expire, and that the act of Congress of July,
1866, in which the statute referred to was contained, was
the only authoritative law on the subject at the time.
In the Michigan case, a homestead entryman had settled upon the land but had not yet acquired his patent. The
railroad company had located its line across his land and
the question was as to whether or not the railroad company
was authorized to acquire the right of way under the section above quoted. We quote from Judge Cooley's opinion:
"The section of the act of 1866, on which reliance is placed, declares 'that the right of way for
the construction of highways over public lands, not
reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.' This is
not limited in time, and seems to be amply sufficient
in scope, if railways are highways within its meaning. This is disputed.
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"There is no doubt that when the term 'highways' is used in legislation, the common highways
for the country are generally to be understood. But
this is not universally true. There are other highways than these, and the sense in which the word i8
employed must be determined by the end which the
legislation has in view, and by the context. Here a
right of way is given for highways, and the question
is whether the purpose was to give the right for other
roads than the common wagon roads of the country,
or other roads open to the public for use in the same
way.
"The subject is not free from doubt, but we are
inclined to think, and shall so hold, that all highways
were intended. A forcible reason for this conclusion
is that we can conceive of no considerations operating to induce congress to grant the right of way for
wagon roads, and not grant it for other public high.
ways. * * * It is a matter of notoriety that, in
the absence of legislation, roads have been freely
laid out across the public lands, without objection or
controversy, wherever the lands were not appropriated or desired for other public uses. Such roads
facilitate the settlement of the country, and benefit
the neighborhood, and in both particulars they fur.
ther a general policy of the federal government. But
they also tend to increase the value of the public
lands, and for this reason are favored. And what
the common highways of the country accomplish in
this direction the railroads of the country accomplish to a much greater extent.
"As bearing upon the construction of the act of
1866 we may well take notice of the fact that, at the

time the United States were seeking to stimulate and
encourage the construction of railroads in the newer
sections of the ·country by making large grants of
land to the projectors, two motives may be said to
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have influenced this action: First, the general benefit to the country by encouraging new settlements;
second, the general benefit to the interest of the
United States, as proprietor of other lands, by giving to such other lands additional market value, and
creating increased demand for them. It would certainly be very remarkable if, while thus pursuing a
policy of liberal encouragement to railroads, the
United States should purposely withhold a favor so
unimportant to the government as permission to
cross the public domain ; a permission, too, almost
certain, so far as it had influence, to be beneficial.
It would be specially remarkable if, in so withholding this privilege, the United States were, in fact,
discriminating against this form of thoroughfare.
"It is true railroads are not, in the proper sense
of that terms, highways, but they have been frequently called highways in the decisions of the federal supreme court. Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall.
654, 663; Railroad Company v. County of Ottoe, 16
Wall. 667, 673. It is not an unreasonable inference
that the legislative department of the government
rnay sometimes have employed the word in the same
sens~. Plank-roads and macadamized roads, which
are open to use by the whole public with their own
teams and vehicles, are highways in the strictest
sense, and yet these, which with railroads were provided for specially by the act of 1852, are only provided for now by the act of 1866. We may well suppose that the act of 1852 was limited in terms to the
roads constructed by private companies, because the
tacit acquiescence by the United States in the construction of highways by the states and territories
over its lands made further provisions unnecessary;
but that act was suffered to expire because subsequently it was deemed best, by a general provision
in the act of 1866, to embrace all public ways, this
at once giving the sanction of law to the custom of
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taking public lands for common wagon roads, and
providing for other roads also. This would account
for the fact, which otherwise would at least seem
very strange, that congress suffered the limitation
in time, imposed by the act of 1852, to run out
without making any new or further provision for
the special benefit of the companies which by that
act were favored. All the considerations which
should lead to the assistance of such companies, so
far as the giving of a right of way would assist
them, are as forcible today as they ever were. They
were not peculiar to the twenty-five years following
the enactment of the law of 1852.
"V.f e shall hold, therefore, that the act of 1866,
which gives a right of way for all highways, embraces within its intent railways, and that by force
of it the complainant was entitled to a right of way
across the lands in dispute unless the homestead
entry of defendant constituted an impediment.

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"To acquire the benefit tendered by the act of
1866 nothing more was necessary than for the road
to be constructed. No patent is required in such
cases ; but the offer and acceptance taken together
are equivalent to a grant. The complainant, therefore, by accepting the offer of the government, obtained a grant of the right of way which was at least
perfectly good as against the government, and must
be held to be perfectly good as against this defendant unless his patent ante-dates it by relation, or
unless the equities springing from his possession and
improvement would preclude any right being acquired adversely.
"It is not very clear that under the general rail·

road law so peculiar an interest as that of the de.
fendant could have been appropriated by adversary
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proceedings, and it is certain that complainant could
have been under no obligation to proceed to an appropriation of the interest of the United States, if
that interest was freely granted by that act of 1866,
as we think it was. Complainant accepted the offer
of that act, and the contruction of its road under
the offer would be not only a sufficient but also an
equitable consideration. And when the right was
thus perfected we do not think it could have been
defeated by any act or relation springing from the
accomplishment of something subsequently."
It will be noted that some question was raised as to the

right of the homesteader to require payment for his interest in the land and although it seBmed that the court decided against the entryman on that point, still the question
was not seriously in dispute because of the fact that the
railroad company had offered to make such payment, and
concerning these improvements the court said:
"We should infer from the statement of facts
that those actually made within the limits of the
right of way were inconsiderable, and for those the
complainant offered to make payment. * * *
the decree should have allowed the defendant to take
a reference to compute the value of the improvements made within the limits appropriated by complainants, and it will be modified by this court so
as to permit that to be done."
About the only case which has directly questioned the
decision of Judge Cooley" in the Michigan case on his interpretation of the word "highways" is the Johnson case from
Kansas, and as above stated, such a holding was unnecessary
in that case and the case has been cited as holding that the
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homestead entry segregated the land from the public domain.
In Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Richter, 148 P. 478,
the Supreme Court of New Mexico quoted and followed
Judge Cooley's holding in the Michigan case that a railroad
company could acquire a right of way under the 1866 act.
In referring to the Michigan case, the New Mexico court
said:
"The opinion is by Judge Cooley and for that
reason if for no other deserves the most careful consideration."
In that case the New Mexico court held very directly that
a homestead entryman was entitled to compensation, but
affirmed the right of the railroad company to acquire a
right of way under the act of 1866. The New Mexico court
in that case concluded:
"We conclude that under Section 2477, R. S.
U. S., no right can be secured which is superior to
the right of an intervening coal entryman who has
filed his declaratory statement prior to the accept-

ance of the grant by a railroad company."
Under date of March 3, 1875, in order to give further
impetus to railroad building for development of new areas
and to expand our national frontiers, Congress passed an
act specifically giving railroads a 10Q..foot right of way over
public domain and imposed certain conditions which had to
be tnet. Judge Cooley referred to this act in the Michigan
case, as did some of the other courts who discussed the act
of 1866.
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In the case of Tennessee & C. R. Co. v. Taylor, (Ala.
1894), 14 So. 379, the Supreme Court of Alabama had the
question of the 1866 act and its application to a railroad
company before it. A railroad company had taken possession of a strip of land through the public domain sometime
prior to the 1875 act ("more than twenty years before suit
brought"), and had graded a roadbed over the area but
had not constructed its ties and rails thereon at a time when
an entryman purchased and secured patent to the property
from the U. S. Government. As a matter of fact, the railroad company had allowed the strip to lie for some time
uncompleted after it had cleared and graded its roadbed
thereon, but after the purchase of the title by the individual
f'rom the U.S. Government the railroad completed this construction and laid its rails and ties over the previously constructed roadbed. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that
the railroad had a "highway'; under the section o£ federal
statute heretofore referred to. We quote from the opinion
of the Alabama Supreme Court:
"The theory of defendant is that it acquired
title to the 100-foot strip as right of way by the location of its line and construction of its roadbed
thereon prior to the sale to plaintiff, by force of
section 2477 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, which declares that 'the right of way for the
construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public uses, is hereby granted.' That a
railroad is a 'highway' within this section, would
seem to have been the understanding of congress in
the passage of the act of 1866 in aid of the construction of this and other railroads in Alabama, for
while careful provision is made by that act for the
acquisition of a right of way over reserved land em-
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braced in the general terms of the grant, but specially excepted therefrom, no provision is therein
made for rights of way over other public land ; an
omission which, in view of the fact that at that time
there was no law, state or federal, other than this
section, for the acquisition of rights of way over
public lands, is most reasonably accounted for on
the theory that congress supposed that section 2477
applied to railroad rights of way over all public
lands 'not reserved to public uses.' And this is the
construction put on the section in every instance of
direct adjudication. Railway Co. v. Gordon, 41 Mich.
420, 2 N. W. 648; Verdier v. Railroad Co., 15 S. C.
476; Sams v. Railway Co., !d., 484. Indeed, there
is nothing in the adjudged cases against this view,
except the merest dictum in Railroad Co. v. Sture,
32 Minn. 95, 20 N. W. 229, a case arising under the
act of March 3, 1875, (18 Stat. 482), which superseded the application of section 2477 to railroads,
and was in the nature of an amendment by implication to that effect, not, however, affecting rights
acquired under the section in question prior to the
amendatory enactment. We concur in the construction put on the statute by the Michigan and South
Carolina courts, and hold that it operated to grant
rights of way for the construction of railway highways over public lands at the time the defendant
located its line and constructed its roadbed on the
strip sued for."
The Supreme Court of Oregon in Wallowa County v.
Wade, 72 P. 793, uses the following language in referring
to the 1866 act :
"While the language of this act is somewhat
indefinite and uncertain it has usually been construed as a present grant of an easement over public lands for highways, and that it is not confined to
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technical public highways, but is applicable to railways and toll roads."
The fact that railroads were considered as highways
is further confirmed by early text writers. Elliot on Roads
and Streets, Third Edition, Vol. 1:

"* * * the term highway is the generic
name for all kinds of public ways, including county
and township roads, streets, alleys, turnpikes and
plank roads, railroads and tramways, bridges and
ferries, canals and navigable rivers."
So. K. Ry. Co. v. Oklahoma (Okla.), 69 P. 1050;
Donovan v. Pennsylvania Co., 199 U. S. 279, 26
S. Ct. 91, 50 L. Ed. 192;
Strange v. Board of Commissioners (Ind.), 91
N. E. 242;
Detroit International Bridge Co. v. American
Seed Co., (Mich.), 228 N. W. 791.
The early constitutions of many of the states provided
that railroads were public highways. The Utah Constitution merely states that railroads are common carriers subject to legislative control (Art. XII, Sec. 12), but in the
Constitution of the State of Idaho, adopted approximately
ten years before the Utah Constitution, Art. XI, Sec. 5, it
was provided :
"All railroads shall be public highways, and all
railroad transportation and express companies shall
be common carriers and subject to legislative control."
This Idaho provision was similar to a provision of the
New York Constitution, as well as that of many other states
joining the Union prior to Idaho.
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In determining whether the Johnson case from Kansas
contains "the best reasoning" or whether Judge Cooley's
opinion does, we must consider the background against
which each of the judges at the time may have interpreted
the statutory provision. Interpretation of such a provision
based upon conditions as we know them today would clearly
give us a different outlook than might have been the case
in 1866. The opinion of Judge Cooley, issued in 1879, was
preceded only three years by a decision of the Supreme
Court of the United States which gives somewhat of a history of the development of railroads and the understanding
that was had of them, not alone by members of the public
but by members of congress and legislators generally. We
refer to the case of Lake Superior & Miss. R. R. Co. v.
United States (1876), 93 U.S. 442, 23 L. Ed. 965. The opening paragraph of the opinion reads:
"Congress, in most of the legislative acts by
which it has made donations of the public lands to
the States in which they lie for the purpose of aiding in the construction of railroads, has stipulated
that the railroads so aided shall be public highway~
for the use of the government, free from all tolls or
other charge for transportation of its property or
troops."
The Supreme Court, in the opinion, refers to an early statute and says :
"It will be observed that the last-cited act was
passed in 1833, when railroads were about being introduced as means of public communication in this
country. It is undoubtedly familiar to most of those
whose recollection goes back to that period, that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

45

railroads were generally expected to be public high..
ways, on which every man who could procure the
proper carriages and apparatus would have the
right to travel. This was the understanding in
England, where they originated. The Railway
Clauses Consolidation Act, passed in 1842, provided
in detail for the use of railways by all persons who
might choose to put carriages thereon, upon payment
of the tolls demandable, subject to the provisions of
the statute and the regulations of the company."
The court then goes on to refer to various statutes, includ..
ing those setting up the charters of early railroads, and
likewise refers to the trend of development of railroads to
the point where the railroad companies not only provided
the "highway", but also furnished the vehicles and performed the complete course of transportation. The Supreme
Court then states:
"Be this, however, as it may, the general course
of legislation referred to sufficiently demonstrates
the fact, that in the early history of railroads it was
quite generally supposed that they could be publie
highways in fact as well as in name."
The foregoing Supreme Court case while only three
years ahead of Judge Cooley's decision in the Michigan
case was still ten years after the date of the 1866 statute.
The Johnson case in Kansas was nearly ten years after
the Michigan case, during which time following the general
railroad right of way act of March 3, 1875, there was great
railroad expansion throughout the country and a general
development of railroads into large general transportation
companies rather than companies which merely provided
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a "highway" for the vehicles of others. It was apparent
that the Judge in the Johnson case was influenced by the
later development and saw what was immediately before
him and did not, as Judge Cooley did, go back the nearly
twenty years to see what the actual background was at the
time and prior to the time of the passing of the act of 1866.
Indeed the development of railroads into general transportation companies rather than companies which merely constructed and operated a "highway" like a plank road or
toll road furnished the basis for a separate act with respect
to them as was embodied in the act of March 3, 1875. This
does not afford a basis for reasoning that the 1866 act did
not apply to railroads, but indicates very strongly that it
did, and the act of 1875 became necessary because of the
difference in the trend of the development of railroads generally.
A still earlier case from the Supreme Court of the
United States, decided one year after the construction of
the railroad involved in the case at bar and before the act
of Congress of 1875, providing specifically for railroad
rights of way over the public domain, is the case of Olcott
v. The Supervisors, (1872), 16 Wall. 678. In that case, at
page 694, the Supreme Court stated:
"That railroads, though constructed by private
corporations and owned by them, are public highways, has been the doctrine of nearly all the courts
ever since such conveniences for passage and transportation have had any existence."
The court goes on to say that the building of a railroad is
considered as an act done for a public use and then adds:
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"And the reason why the use has always been
held a public one is that such a road is a highway,
whether made by the government itself or by the
agency of corporate bodies, or even by individuals
when- they obtain their power to construct it from
legislative grant."

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

"That all persons may not put their own cars
upon the road, and use their own motive power, has
no bearing upon the question whether the road is
a public highway."

"It is said that railroads are not public highways per se; that they are only declared such by
the decisions of the courts, and that they have been
declared public only with respect to the power of
eminent domain. This is a mistake. In their very
nature they are public highways. It needed no decision of courts to make them such."
If anything more authoritative or showing a "better reasoning" could be had we think that it could not possibly
change the conclusion that when the act of 1866 was passed
it was considered by congress, the courts, and the public in
general that railroads were "highways" and therefore included with the act of 1866.
In Cherokee Nation v. Kansas City Ry. Co., 135 U. S.
641, at 657, 10 S. Ct. 965, 34 L. Ed. 295, the United States
Supreme Court, in 1890, again reaffirms these prior cases
as follows:

"* * * the question is no longer an open
one, as to whether a railroad is a public highway,
established primarily for the convenience of the
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people, and to subserve public ends, and, therefore,
subject to governmental control and regulation. It
is because it is a public highway * * * "
In view of the foregoing, there is no escape from the
conclusion that the predecessors in interest of the plaintiff
in the case at bar were included within the provisions of
the 1866 federal act and entitled to a right of way over the
public domain for construction of the railroad. As was
stated by Judge Cooley: "To acquire the benefit tendered
by the act of 1866 nothing rnore was necessary than for the
road to be constructed. No patent is required in such cases."
This actual construction is held by all the cases to amount
to an acceptance of the grant. There is and can be no dispute of the fact that the predecessor of plaintiff actually
constructed its railroad here at a time when the property
was still public domain. It thereby acquired a right of way
under the federal act referred to. But it even went further
and afterwards secured full warranty deeds from adjoining
owners whose subsequently issued patents included the
property on which the railroad had been constructed.
APPELLANT'S POINT 1 (d)
Under its point (d) Murray City refers to abandonment. We do not know just what appellant has in mind
with respect to this point. There has been no intimation
or suggestion that there has been any abandonment of any
of the traveled portion of the roadway as it has existed
west of the tracks. If the appellant intends to refer to a
supposed roadway 1·eferred to in the ancient deeds, our only
answer is that there is no sufficient competent evidence of
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the establishment of a roadway at any place other than
that as now used west of the tracks. The recitals in the
deeds no more prove the existence of a roadway north of
6400 South than they do south of 6400 South, where all of
plaintiff's witnesses admit there never was a roadway. The
supposed roadway referred to in the ancient deeds, as shown
by Murray engineer's own platting (Exhibit D-12), would
have been to the west of the tracks, anyway, where a prescriptive right of travel has been acquired.
The only competent and proper evidence of any nature
shows a roadway having been acquired by use west of the
tracks, with such use beginning around 1900 or shortly
thereafter, at the time Murray City was incorporated as a
city and at the time the American Smelting & Refining
smelter was located there. The roadway, even as it exists
west of the tracks, could not have become established under
the evidence in this case prior to the incorporation of Murray City in 1903.
The statute, U. C. A., 1953, section 27-1-3, concerning
abandonment, as cited by appellant, refers to counties and
not to cities. Tucker v. Conrad (Ind.), 2 N. E. 803; Sowadzki v. Salt Lake County, 36 Utah 127, 104 P. 111.
If appellant by mentioning "abandonment" intended
to refer to any roadway east of the tracks, we must answer
that there is no definite, competent evidence from which
any court could definitely locate and define such a claimed
roadway. Where did it start, and how far did it extend?
"It didn't go all the way to 6400 South" (R. 133). The
mayor testified that such a way was traveled for 300 or
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400 yards north and south "in front of the school" (R. 121),
Wahlquist said "400 yards, more or less" (R. 110). Where
did it cross the tracks? There was no crossing in front of
the school (R. 121). All of the homes east of the tracks
have private crossings over the tracks (Exhibit P-11).
Would one of these be the terminus, and if so which one?
All of these private crossings have apparently been in existence "since the memory of man runneth not to the contrary." Did any of these owners use a roadway east of the
tracks instead of crossing over to the west? If so, why the
private crossing over the tracks immediately in front of
each private home? And who used this supposed roadway?
The mayor and Mr. Wahlquist used it about two years each
to go to the Liberty School around 1903 to 1905. Aside
from that, the mayor said people going to do business with
the Pioneer Nurseries used it (R. 133). This would indicate a private rather than a public roadway. And where
was it located with reference to the track? It was supposed
to pass in front of the Liberty School. The school as it
exists today was constructed in 1905 (R. 104). As shown
by Exhibit P-20, with such roadway passing in front of the
school it would have to have been some distance to the east
of the tracks and railroad right of way. When 6100 South
Street was opened in 1905, about the time the new school
was constructed (R. 106), it was extended right across to
the west side of the tracks. If there was a definite roadway east of the tracks in that vicinity, the people to the
north and south would have used it more than ever before
and would have gone east to State Street over 6100 South
Street. They would not have crossed the tracks to the west
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in front of their homes and then gone north or south to
6100 South Street and recrossed the tracks to east; they
would have continued to travel east of the track to 6100
South Street and then east to State Street, and the roadway
east of the tracks would thus have been continued in use
to date, as well as that west of the tracks. Not only that,
but there would have been some evidence of the location of
the roadway, rather than hills and hollows, irrigation
ditches and depressed cattail swamps as exist today in the
area east of the tracks (Exhibits P-20 to P-24).
It is impossible to conclude from the evidence that
there was any definitely established public roadway to the
east of the tracks, and the trial court, as the trier of fact,
who not only saw and heard the witnesses but made a personal inspection of the area, must be affirmed in so far as
his conclusions with respect to lack of any roadway east of
the tracks is concerned.

Again, we repeat and confidently urge that there must
be a highway shown to exist in the first instance before
there can be any necessity of argument with respect to
abandonment of such a highway.
RESPONDENT'S POINTS 1 AND 1 (A)
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MURRAY CITY HELD IN TRUST FOR THE PUBLIC A FEE TITLE TO THE PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 17 OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND IN FAILING TO FIND
THAT MURRAY CITY AND THE PUBLIC
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HELD ONLY PRESCRIPTIVE RIGHTS
SAID DESCRIBED PROPERTY.

IN

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING, AS SET
FORTH IN FINDING NUMBER 9, THAT THE
PUBLIC USED AND ACQUIRED A RIGHT OF
WAY OVER SAID PROPERTY WHILE THE
SAME WAS STILL PUBLIC DOMAIN.
Respondent will here combine reference to its points
1 and 1 (A).
There is and can be no dispute concerning the fact
that the Utah Southern Railroad Company, predecessor in
interest of the plaintiff railroad companies, secured full
warranty deeds from the patentees who secured proper
title from the United States Government to all but a small
strip of land involved herein. With respect to that small
strip in the north portion of Section 24, the railroad company's records indicated a right by court order over that
strip of property, but plaintiff was unable to secure or
furnish proper evidence of that court order (R. 41). However, a copy of the ownership plat from the county recorder's office was introduced in evidence as Exhibit P-6. The
county recorder is required by law to make and maintain
ownership plats showing the ownership of each tract of land
in the county. He must keep these plats up to date and
furnish a copy each year to the county assessor for tax
assessment purposes, and the tax assessor, after assessing
taxes, must return the plats to the recorder for corrections,
changes or additions for each ensuing year. (Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, Title 17, Chapter 21, Sections 21 to 23.)
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The assessor uses these in making up his tax assessment
rolls, for tax purposes. The county recorder is not required
to go back of 1899 to check these ownership plats. The
reason the year 1899 is given is because such law was first
enacted in 1899 and has been continued practically unchanged to date. (See Laws of Utah, 1899, Chapter 41,
page 61, Section 1.) The fact that the law, even as it exists
today, indicates the county recorder should go back to 1899
would indicate that what is shown on the plat, Exhibit P-6,
is a record of long standing, although it has apparently
been added to from time to time as is shown by the platted
subdivisions adjoining the OSL right-of-way property.
As to such records, Wigmore in his work on Evidence,
says, Vol. 5, Third Edition, section 1640, page 552:

"* * * No one maintains that they are conclusive, but at least they afford some evidence to a
rational mind seeking the truth."
The evidence further shows as to this strip that the
railroad was built thereon while the land was still public
domain. This in itself gives a fee title to the railroad company under the federal act, 43 U. S. C. A. 932.
The evidence shows without contradiction that the
4-rod strip in the north portion of Section 24 has been
enclosed within right-of-way fences since about 1917 (Exhibits D-10 and P-37), and is so fenced today (R. 109-110).
Since 1917, this strip, together with the rest of the area,
as shown on Exhibits P-7, 8, and 9, has, by exact platting
and description, been assessed as railroad property and
taxes paid thereon to the State of Utah and other taxing
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units, including the City of Murray (R. 47, 50). This evidence should compel the conclusion that the plaintiff Oregon
Short Line Railroad Company is the owner in fee simple of
this strip of land in the north portion of Section 24. As
to all the remainder of the property involved in this action
there cannot be any dispute as to the title received by the
railroad company by virtue of the warranty deeds from
the patentees in addition to building said railroad track
over the land while it was public domain, which in itself
give~ a fee title.
As contrasted to this evidence, there is no competent
evidence of any kind of any USE of any of the area as a
roadway while it was public domain, nor at any time prior
to about 1900.
The use by the public generally of this strip west of
the tracks has been of a sufficient nature and of sufficient
duration to require a holding that the public has acquired
a right of way by prescription in such westerly strip.
It would be but useless repetition to refer here to the
many authorities and to repeat the argument included in
pages 12 to 19 and 25 to 33 of this brief. In connection with
respondent's points 1 and 1 (A), we wish merely to refer the
court back to what has been said on page 12 of this briefthat we would apply the argument and law then being set
forth to our later reference to respondent's points 1 and
1 (A). The argument and the authorities therein referred to
are as pertinent to respondent's points 1 and 1 (A) as they
are to respondent's view of appellant's points 1 (a), (b) and
(c), and we think they must compel a conclusion in favor
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of the position taken by the respondent, that the railroad
company has the fee title to the full 4-rod width and the
defendant Murray City and the public generally merely a
prescriptive right, over the defined area to the west of the
tracks.
RESPONDENT'S POINTS 2 AND 3.
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING AS IT
DID IN ITS CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE THAT MURRAY CITY HAD THE RIGHT
TO LAY SEWER LINES WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM PLAINTIFFS AND ERRED IN
DENYING THE INJUNCTION SOUGHT BY
PLAINTIFFS.
We acknowledge here that if Murray City holds in trust
for the public the fee title to the strip west of the tracks,
and if this court should so conclude, then respondent's
points 2 and 3 would not be well taken. Nevertheless, we
respectfully urge that such holding is not in any manner
warranted or justified by the evidence. Assuming, therefore, that the rights of the city and the public exist only
by prescription, what is the extent of those rights?
We must admit that the right to travel over the surface as pedestrians and by horses, wagons, carts, automobiles and other motor vehicles does now and has existed
for some time by virtue of long-continued use for upwards
of fifty years. The oil surface has for over twenty years
past confirmed that use and, in addition, has served to define the extent of such use.
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We must admit that the city has by long-continued use
acquired the right to erect and maintain its power pole line
down the west side of the traveled portion west of the
tracks, as well as the right to maintain some poles for
power line on the east side as now existing for a short
distance both north and south of 6100 South Street.
The city also installed a 4-inch culinary water line
under the surface of the ground to the westerly side of the
oil surfaced and traveled portion west of the tracks. That
culinary water line has now existed and been maintained
a sufficient length of time to establish a right by prescription (R. 134-136). Does that prescriptive right to maintain a 4-inch culinary water line under the westerly side of
the traveled portion, give a right-by prescription or otherwise-to now lay a 12-inch sewer line under such traveled
portion in close proximity to the railroad tracks? If the
city does not hold the fee,-an<;I we insist under the evidence
it cannot-, by what right does it claim to add an additional burden by laying the sewer line?
If A acquires a right by prescription to run one irrigation ditch across the property of B, does that right give A
the license, permission or authority to construct a larger
and second irrigation ditch across B's land in a different
location, even though it may parallel and be in close proximity to the first and smaller ditch? It would seem to need
no authority to bring a vehement denial in answer to the
latter question.
"An easement acquired by prescription is always limited to the use made during the prescriptive
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period." Robins v. Roberts, 80 Utah 409, 15 P. 2d
340; Stephens Ranch & Livestock Co. v. Union Pac.
R. R. Co., 48 Utah 528, 161 P. 459.
"A right of way for one purpose gained by user
cannot be turned into a right of way for another
purpose if the latter adds materially to the burden
of the servient estate. * * * The servient estate can only be subjected to the easement to the
extent to which the easement was acquired and the
easement owner cannot change this use so as to put
any greater burden upon the servient estate." Nielsen v. Sandberg, 105 Utah 93, 141 P. 2d 696.

"* * * An increase in the burden on the
servient tenement beyond that caused by the adverse use by which an easement was created is an
undue increase if it is such an increase as it may
reasonably be assumed would have provoked an interruption in the adverse use had the increase occurred during the prescriptive period. * * *"
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch v. Moyle, 109 Utah
197, 159 P. 2d 596.
The railroad company objected when the city put its
culinary water line down along the west side of the traveled
portion west of the track. It insisted on signed agreements
where the water lines extended under the track (R. 136).
The use of that area for a culinary water line, however, was
not a serious threat to the railroad company's property or
operations, and although the railroad company objected it
filed no action. THE LAYING OF A 12-INCH SEWER
MAIN, AT A DEPTH OF 8 FEET, MUCH NEARER THE
TRACKS IS A DIFFERENT MATTER. The railroad company did not say it would not permit the laying of the sewer
but merely asked the city to enter into an agreement to pro-
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teet the railroad properties, and to define the location and
manner of work to be done, and defining rights during the
existence of the sewer in such location. The prayer of the
complaint was for an injunction, unless and until the city
entered into an agreement with the railroad company, or
until the city otherwise acquired a right of way by eminent
domain (R. 5-6). The city refused to do either.
Railroads all over the country have been installing
modern electrical control systems for the movement of
trains. The Union Pacific Railroad Company has such centralized train control over a good part of its system. It has
planned to install an electric signal system through Murray,
and it is even likely that the Interstate Commerce Commission might order installation of centralized train control
through this area ( R. 64) . In order to install such electrical control, it would be necessary to put underground cables
to the west of the existing tracks (R. 65) and also to locate
control boxes west of the tracks. Thus, the use not only
of the surface immediately west of the track but also of the
subsurface may become of vital necessity to the railroad
company, and the right to lay these subsurface cables is
important even though part of the surface over them may
be used for public travel. The culinary water line to the
west would not affect such underground cables, but the
proposed sewer would.
The proposition we think is elementary and is unanimously supported by all authorities, that the acquisition by
the public of one easement in land gives no right to another or different easement and a prescriptive way ac-
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quired by a particular user cannot justify a materially enlarged user which has not been enjoyed for the full prescriptive period.
If a street or roadway is a dedicated street, as was in-

volved in White v. Salt Lake City, . . . Utah ... , 239 P.
2d 210, the question presented is a different one because
in such instance the city or county does hold the fee in
trust for the public. But there have been no dedicated
streets in the Murray area involved herein (R. 85-86), and
where the right of use rests merely in prescription, as the
one at bar must, then the past right acquired by the prescriptive use cannot be extended or enlarged without permission of the fee owner of the property-the plaintiff
railroad company in this case. See District of Columbia v.
Robinson, 180 U. S. 92, 21 S. Ct. 283, 45 L. Ed. 440; Hofius
v. Carnegie Steel Corp. (Ohio), 67 N. E. 2d 429; City of
Park Ridge v. Wisner (Ill.), 97 N. E. 841; Ward v. Triple
State Natural Gas & Oil Co. (Ky.), 74 S. W. 709; Board
of Supervisors v. Manuel (Va.), 88 S. E. 54; Board of
Supervisors v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (Va.), 91 S. E. 124.

CONCLUSION
The evidence clearly and without dispute shows that
the railroad in question was constructed in its present location while the property was all still public domain. Under
43 U. S. C. A. 932, this gave a right of way in fee to the
railroad company to such a width as would reasonably be
necessary for railroad purposes. Immediately upon patents
being issued, the railroad company secured full warranty
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deeds from the patentees, enlarging this right of way to
a strip 4 rods wide over the southern portion of the area
involved and 100 feet wide over the northern portion. A
small area in the north portion of Section 24 was not included in these warranty deeds, but through that area the
4-rod right of way has been claimed by the railroad company, has been fenced, has been assessed to the railroad
company for tax purposes, and taxes paid thereon to the
proper taxing authorities, including both the state of Utah
and l\1:urray City since at least the year 1917.
The record is absolutely void of any evidence of USE
by any party whatsoever of any of the area as a roadway
prior to the time patents were issued, and while the property was still public domain. The recitals in ancient deeds
are not competent or sufficient in and of themselves to
prove the establishment or existence of the roadway and
could not, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered
as evidence of USE of any roadway while the property was
still public domain.
The evidence is competent and sufficient to show that
a roadway by prescription has been acquired over the westerly strip beginning 11 feet and more to the west of the
track and extending on westerly and including, also, a prescriptive right over the cross streets. This prescriptive
use includes the right to maintain power pole lines down
the westerly side (plus a few as exist on the east side). It
includes a right to maintain an underground 4-inch culinary water line down the west side and includes the right
of surface travel over the described westerly strip by

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

61
pedestrians, wagons, carts, automobiles, and other modern
surface traffic. The reasonable necessity and extent of this
surface travel has been well defined by the oiled surface
placed and maintained thereon by Murray City for well
over twenty years past.
The trial court correctly concluded and adjudged that
the railroad company had the fee title to property described
in paragraph 16 of the findings of fact, and his judgment
thereon should be sustained and affirmed.
The trial court erred in finding that the public used
and acquired a right of way over the property described
in finding of fact No. 9 while such property was still public
domain.
The evidence does not warrant nor justify any finding
or judgment other than that the public has acquired prescriptive rights in the property described in said paragraph
9 of the findings of fact, including cross streets, and the
judgment should be modified to so show, and the injunction
as prayed for by plaintiffs should be granted unless the
defendant Murray City secures a proper right of way or
otherwise enters into a contract with plaintiffs with respect
to the laying and maintaining of said sewer line as proposed
and as being undertaken by said city.
Respectfully submitted,
BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. CORAY,
MARVIN J. BERTOCH,
Attorneys for Respondent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

